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RESPONSIBILITY OF INVESTMENT BANKERS
TO SHAREHOLDERS
TED. J. FIFLIS*
Directors who recommend a merger or sale of a business without ade-
quately informing themselves as to the fairness of the price may be liable
in damages to shareholders for breach of the fiduciary duty of care.'
It is widely recognized that directors, seeking to avoid such liability,
may satisfy a large portion of that duty by purchasing an opinion from an
investment banker stating that the transaction is fair from a financial
point of view.2 Both statute and case law permit directors to rely on the
banker's opinion in discharging their duty of care.3
Until lately, bankers have escaped responsibility to shareholders for
negligently prepared fairness opinions. The few cases that have recently
imposed liability have been widely criticized as having a questionable
doctrinal basis. Thus, shareholders may find that no one is legally re-
sponsible to them and that they alone must suffer financial losses a
banker's negligence causes.4
This Article proposes that investment bankers be held responsible to
shareholders. As gatekeepers for corporate control transactions, invest-
ment bankers should be liable as delegates of the board, having the same
fiduciary duties of care, candor, and loyalty that directors have, as well
as a duty of skill.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School; John S. Lehmann Distinguished
Visiting Professor, Washington University School of Law. Mark Thomas, a student at Washington
University School of Law, provided much helpful assistance in the preparation of this Article in a
hectic period, for which I am grateful.
1. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control
Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 120-21 (1986).
3. See, eg., ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.02 (Tent. Draft No. 11
1991); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1984).
4. See Carol B. Haight, Note, The Standard of Care Required of an Investment Banker to
Minority Shareholders in a Cash-Out Merger Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 98, 110-
11 (1983); Giuffra, supra note 2, at 131-32.
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I. Two CATEGORIES OF INVESTMENT BANKERS'
FAIRNESS OPINIONS
Although Smith v. Van Gorkom expressly stated5 that an investment
banker fairness opinion is not necessary for directors to fulfill their duty
of care, it has had the effect of making a fairness opinion standard operat-
ing procedure in most control transactions affecting shareholder
interests.6
In some transactions, shareholders are given the opinion or its con-
tents in proxy or information statements, with the expectation that they
may or will rely on it to some extent. For example, when a parent corpo-
ration merges with a less than wholly owned subsidiary and pays cash in
lieu of shares to the subsidiary's minority shareholders, and when the
merger is conditioned upon approval of a majority of the minority, those
shareholders may rely on a fairness decision to decide whether to ap-
prove the deal. Further, management buyouts (MBOs) of publicly held
companies, similarly conditioned on minority shareholder approval, may
rely on a fairness opinion's convincing minority shareholders to assent to
the transaction.
In going-private transactions,7 the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) requires a company to disclose the board's opinion whether
the transaction is fair to shareholders.8 Extensive disclosure of any in-
vestment banker's report is also required for other transactions involving
similar conflicts of interest.9 Practitioners report that the SEC staff re-
cently has been requiring the same extensive disclosure concerning fair-
ness opinions for arm's-length transactions, such as negotiated mergers
with nonaffiliates.10 The SEC's required disclosure includes a summary
of the report, opinion, or appraisal, including: "the procedures followed;
the findings and recommendations; the bases for and methods of arriving
5. See 488 A.2d at 876.
6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What
Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 28.
7. A "going-private transaction," described in SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1991),
is generally a transaction that results in a company's shares' being no longer publicly traded on an
exchange or on NASDAQ (the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8 (1991).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 239.25, form S-4, Item 4(b) (1991); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 14(a)(10)
(1991).
10. See Memorandum of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Fairness Opinions and "Blue Book"
Analyses (Oct. 22, 1991) (on file with the author).
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at such findings and recommendations; instructions received from the is-
suer or affiliate; and any limitation imposed by the issuer or affiliate on
the scope of the investigation."'"
This expanded disclosure may be expected to encourage skillful and
careful work, but if the bankers fail to produce accurate fairness opin-
ions, extending disclosure requirements to more transactions merely ex-
pands the universe of shareholders who rely on bankers' opinions to their
detriment.
In a second category of cases, the shareholders are not informed of the
banker's opinion, or, if they are, it is not a cause of shareholder action.
Thus in an auction of the entire company, in which the board utilizes a
fairness opinion only in deciding which of many competing offers to sup-
port, shareholders may either not receive or not rely on the opinion.12
II. CURRENT DOCTRINE AS TO BANKERS' LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE OPINIONS
A. Liability of the Banker to Shareholders When the Opinion is
Addressed to Shareholders
The first class of cases, in which the opinion is communicated to share-
holders who may directly rely on it, fits under the rubric of negligent
misrepresentation. In these cases, the familiar question for liability is the
required degree of relationship between the defendant who negligently
utters a misrepresentation and the plaintiff who is injured by relying
upon the representation: privity of contract, actual foreseeability, or rea-
sonable foreseeability?
In New York, for physical torts, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. '3
toppled the citadel of privity in 1928, extending liability to all who are
"reasonably foreseeable" victims of the negligent act or omission. But
shortly thereafter, when the question arose whether an auditor was liable
to persons who foreseeably relied on negligently audited financial state-
ments, Chief Judge Cardozo refused to depart from the requirement of
privity, or at least "near privity," as established in the prior decision of
Glanzer v. Shepard. 4 Only those whose action was the "end and aim"' 5
11. Id.
12. For a compilation of additional illustrations see Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 6.
13. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
14. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,448 (N.Y. 1931); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E.
275 (N.Y. 1922).
15. Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 445 (quoting Wolfskehl v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 Hun.
542 (N.Y. 1887)).
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of the negligent misrepresentation could recover for this pecuniary tort
because to hold otherwise "may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." 6
More recently, the New York Court of Appeals, in Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. ,17 reiterated and further spelled out the
privity or near-privity requirement for auditors' liability. In that opin-
ion, the Court reviewed the near-privity requirement of Glanzer,' UI-
tramares v. Touche, I and a third decision, White v. Guarente,20 in its
decision to reaffirm that doctrine. The court would not hold defendant
accountants liable to "noncontractual parties" unless certain criteria
were satisfied.21 First, an accountant must be aware that the financial
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes.22 Second,
he or she must know that the specific noncontractual party will rely on
the information. Third, there must be some conduct between the ac-
countant and noncontractual party that "link[s]" the parties together
and that "evinces the accountants' understanding of... [the noncontrac-
tual party's] reliance. ' 23 The court expressly refused to overrule the pol-
icy arguments set forth in the earlier cases.24
Despite the settled state of New York law on auditors' liability to
shareholders, yet another opinion provides a note of caution for cases
involving others. In Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway, Judge Cardozo
warned that metaphors are not to be relied upon blindly, as they are
dangerous. 25 Even if an auditor may be held liable in New York to per-
sons in near privity who rely on the auditor's misrepresentation, the same
rule may not apply against an investment banker. Indeed, the recent
Bank of Kuwait 26 case illustrates that point. There, a federal district
court held that, given the unique facts that case presented, near privity
with a lawyer was not enough to invoke liability-strict privity of con-
16. Id. at 444.
17. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
18. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
19. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
20. 372 N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977).
21. Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 116.
22. Id. at 118.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 119. See also supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
25. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
26. United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assoc., 755 F.
Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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tract was necessary lest the attorney-client privilege be invaded.2 7
Nevertheless, a New York appellate court, in Wells v. Shearson Leh-
man/American Express, Inc. ,28 a case involving the Metromedia man-
agement buyout, held that privity was not required, and that near privity
existed between the investment banker who issued a fairness opinion to
the Metromedia board and the Metromedia shareholders, which was suf-
ficient to hold the banker directly liable. The Metromedia board had
published and distributed the fairness opinion to shareholders to per-
suade them to approve the MBO.29 The bankers had opined that an
MBO at a price of $1.1 billion was fair. However, just over one year
later, management resold the assets of the corporation for over $4.5 bil-
lion, making a disconcerting $3.4 billion profit at the shareholders' ex-
pense. The Appellate Division found sufficient near privity because a
special committee of the board, set up to protect shareholders, hired the
bankers to aid in determining fairness and provided shareholders with
the opinion. The court said that, in such circumstances, the bankers
were aware that they were "retained to advise the shareholders."30
Although Wells does not say that the special committee acted as an
agent of the shareholders, some have so read it. Such a reading would
seem inappropriate. The court there merely applied the familiar near-
privity rule, consistent with the Ultramares -Credit Alliance line of cases
that New York courts previously had decided.31
27. Id. at 1200-04. In United Bank of Kuwait, the court thought that if the borrower client had
requested its lawyer to deliver the opinion to the lender, the lawyer would be liable to the lender
when it made its loan in reliance on the opinion. But because, in fact, the lender made the request of
the lawyer, the lawyer was immune for lack of privity of contract. Id. at 1204.
28. 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1988).
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id.
31. The court's somewhat confusing language should be read with the Glanzer-Ultramares-
Credit Alliance near-privity concept in mind. Like the bean-weigher in Glanzer, who gave his weight
certificate to the buyer at the behest of the seller and who therefore was held to be responsible to the
buyer, the banker who renders an opinion to shareholders at the request of the board should be liable
to the shareholders:
Shearson Lehman and Bear Steams make the untenable assertion that they represented the
officers and therefore were not in privity to the shareholders. The officers, however, cre-
ated a committee whose purpose was to serve the shareholders by determining the fairness
of the buyout. The committee hired Shearson Lehman and Bear Stearns. Anybody hired
by the committee, aiding in its endeavor, was actually retained to advise the shareholders.
Assuming Ms. Wells' complaint is true, and assuming Shearson Lehman and Bear Steams
were aware (as they must have been) that their opinion would be used to help shareholders
decide on the fairness of Metromedia's stock offer, they can be liable to the shareholders.
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Thus, unlike the indeterminate class of lenders without standing to sue
auditors in Ultramares and Credit Alliance, the shareholders of a corpo-
ration are a determinate class when the claimed injury involves a share-
holder vote. Likewise, the banker's liability does not extend
indeterminately since the vote is at a point certain in time. Neither is the
amount indeterminate. Hence the policy bases of Ultramares do not ap-
ply to immunize the bankers. Furthermore, unlike auditors' opinions,
which generally have various uses, in cases like Wells the opinion, as a
primary purpose or "end and aim," seeks to induce the shareholders to
approve the buyout. If it does not serve that function well, it has no
other social utility. The policy goal of eliminating carelessly prepared
fairness opinions would be well served by imposing liability on the
banker.
Other jurisdictions have extended liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion by some professionals beyond near privity to encompass persons
whose injuries from the misrepresentation are "actually foreseeable."
The Restatement of Torts (Second) takes this view.32
A good modem case-law exposition supporting the actual foreseeabil-
ity standard is H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,33 an auditor's liability case
like Ultramares in which the auditor was not in near privity with the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in Rosenblum sold their business to Giant Stores
for common stock, having relied on false financial statements. The plain-
tiffs alleged that Touche Ross had negligently audited and reported on
these statements.
The court explained in part IV of its opinion that policy grounds re-
quired weighing several factors, resulting in departure from the Ul-
32.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the gui-
dance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influ-
ence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to loss
suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the
transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965).
33. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
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tramares near-privity requirement in favor of the Restatement's actual
foreseeability rule:
... policy considerations involve balancing of several factors: "the burden
[that the suggested duty] would put on defendant's activity;.., the risk and
the burden to plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to
the two parties; the prevalence of insurance in fact; the desirability and ef-
fectiveness of putting the pressure to insure on one rather than the other,
and the like." 34
As to Judge Cardozo's policy concern for indeterminate liability, the
court pointed out the well-recognized facts that section 11 of the 1933
Securities Act 35 had long since overturned the privity rule of Ultramares
for misrepresentations in 1933-Act registration statements and that ac-
counting firms had been able to insure against the loss in that situation.
The court stated that this real-world-experiential test disproved Judge
Cardozo's fears of ruinous liability.
Another case adopting the Restatement (Second) view is based on the
tort-law principle that imposes liability on the party deemed to be the
most efficient distributor of the loss. 36 The other pre-1983 cases on both
sides are cited in Credit Alliance.
The only other reported judicial development beyond the Wells case
that involves investment bankers' fairness opinions relied on by share-
holders involves a unique state of affairs in Delaware.
Weinberger v. UOP 37 was a shareholders' class action for unfairness in
a take-out merger by a parent corporation. The original defendants were
the parent corporation and Lehman Brothers, the investment banker that
had passed on the fairness of the price to be paid to the subsidiary's mi-
nority shareholders. The claim against Lehman Brothers rested on an
alleged conspiracy with the parent corporation to fix too low a price and
on a breach of fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. After a full
trial, Vice Chancellor Brown found that (1) there was no conspiracy,
because the plaintiffs proved neither (a) an overt combination nor (b)
damages; and (2) a banker does not owe minority shareholders the same
1
34. Id. at 147 (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., LAW OF TORTS § 18.6,
at 1052 (1956).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
36. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968).
37. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426
A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981 (Feb. 9, 1982), withdrawn and
replaced, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc). The several opinions and a comment on them are
collected in Haight, supra note 4.
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fiduciary duty of entire fairness that the majority shareholder owes
them.38
In an opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court, later withdrawn on
rehearing, Justices McNeilly and Quillen, as the majority, affirmed:
As to Lehman Brothers, we find no basis to upset the findings and con-
clusions of the Vice Chancellor. Nor do we find it fruitful in the present
context to characterize the relationship between Lehman Brothers and
UOP, and the UOP minority, as anything but contractual. The contract
obviously created a duty, including a duty to the minority, but there is no
basis for liability in the present record, given the conclusions of the trier of
fact. Because of its general expertise and financial insight as UOP's invest-
ment banker for many years, Lehman Brothers was employed to render a
fairness opinion for the immediate benefit of the members of UOP's Board
of Directors who were scheduled to meet five days from the date of employ-
ment. The working team of Lehman Brothers submitted its report to the
Board within the time allotted, thereupon fulfilling its duties and obliga-
tions under the agreed upon contractual terms.3 9
Thus, Justices McNeilly and Quillen were of the view that the Vice
Chancellor was correct in finding both a lack of evidence of a conspiracy
and no fiduciary duty of entire fairness owing from Lehman Brothers to
the minority shareholders, although it did owe a "contractual" duty to
the minority.
Justice Duffy, dissenting, evidently realized that the plaintiffs had mis-
cast their argument and the alleged breach of duty was a breach of Leh-
man Brothers' duty of care in preparing the fairness opinion issued to the
minority shareholders. Further, he opined that in Delaware the Restate-
ment approach, eschewing the near-privity requirement in favor of actual
foreseeability, would give the minority shareholders standing to sue.
However, as noted, these opinions were withdrawn on reargument,
and when the plaintiff dropped the claims against Lehman Brothers to
assure that Justice Herrmann would not be disqualified,4' the case
against Lehman Brothers was mooted.
It would appear from these opinions that Delaware courts reasonably
may be expected to apply Justice Duffy's opinion in a case of negligent
38. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981).
39. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981, slip op. at 13 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982) (emphasis in
original). See Haight, supra note 4, at 162-63.
40. It appears that Justice Herrnann's son was employed by the law firm representing the
bankers. See Haight, supra note 4, at 100 n.18.
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misrepresentation to shareholders by a banker, at least if the complaint is
properly cast.
In any event, Wells stands for the proposition that, even under the
narrower near-privity requirement, an investment banker is liable to
shareholders, an actually foreseeable class of possible litigants relying on
the fairness opinion. Thus, either the New York or the Delaware stan-
dard gives standing to such shareholders.
Incidentally, it must be noted that any misrepresentations in a disclo-
sure may impose liability under the federal securities laws' antifraud pro-
visions. Since this Article is concerned with negligence liability under
state law, the federal law is beyond its scope. However, without explor-
ing the technical complexities, it may be noted that for many transac-
tions in which fairness opinions are commonly used, 1933 Act
registration is required.41 These transactions include certain mergers and
acquisitions that use a "wrap-around" prospectus-proxy statement.42
Bankers in these deals may be liable as "experts" under section 11 of the
Securities Act of 193313 unless they establish a "due diligence" defense,
something of a negligence standard with the burden of proof on the de-
fense. Bankers could also be exposed to potential liability as aiders and
abettors of SEC Rule lOb-5 or proxy violations,' but scienter (including
recklessness) is required to invoke these liabilities.45 Bankers may also be
liable as principals under either lOb-5 or the proxy rules; in cases involv-
ing the proxy rules, the appellate courts are split as to whether such an-
cillary parties' mere negligence is actionable.46 Hence, to some extent
negligence liability exists under federal law.
Most likely, as a primary claim plaintiffs will continue to press for
41. Form S-4 is required for certain transactions that both constitute an offering of securities
and require a shareholders' vote and a necessary proxy solicitation.
42. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 293-94 (2d ed. 1988).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
45. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). For a view that recklessness is
sufficient to invoke liability, see also IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); McLean v. Alex-
ander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.
1977).
46. See Herskovitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988) (mere negligence
sufficient to impose liability on investment banker under proxy rules), cerL denied, 489 U.S. 1054,
1060 (1989); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1980) (scienter
required for auditor's liability); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301 (2d Cir. 1973)
(intimating that although negligence is enough for principals, scienter must be shown for ancillary
defendants).
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state-law negligence liability, as in Wells. Of course the SEC's expansion
of disclosure requirements for fairness opinions will, to the extent bank-
ers fail to exercise due care, expand their exposure for negligence under
both state and federal law.
B. Bankers' Liability When the Opinion is Rendered Solely to the
Board or a Committee Thereof
The more challenging problem lies in finding a suitable doctrine for
imposing liability on bankers for the fairness opinions in the second cate-
gory of cases-when only the board of directors uses and relies on the
banker's opinion in exercising its business judgment. In these cases,
there is no misrepresentation to the shareholders and the law of negligent
misrepresentation is not apropos.
In a case arising from the RJR Nabisco auction between manage-
ment-led by Ross Johnson-and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR),
Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co. , the plaintiff claimed, in a New York
forum, that the investment bankers negligently injured the shareholders
in opining that two bids were "substantially equivalent from a financial
point of view."48 The plaintiffs alleged that management's bid was
higher than the KKR bid, which the board nevertheless accepted based
on that opinion. Alternatively, they alleged that, even if the KKR bid
were higher, further bidding should have occurred. The New York Ap-
pellate Division upheld the claim as a matter of New York law on the
novel theory that the special committee of the board conducting the auc-
tion was, in fact, an agent for the shareholders who had contracted with
a sub-agent, the banker. Hence, the banker was also an agent of the
shareholders answerable to them as a fiduciary for failing to act with due
care. The court rejected the claim that this was a matter of Delaware
corporate law under which the board, not the shareholders, would alone
have management of the affairs of the corporation.49
Manifestly, the court's characterization of the question as being one of
agency as opposed to corporate law is actually a rhetorical device for
supporting the holding that the special committee was an agent of the
shareholders and that the banker was a sub-agent of the shareholders.
This clearly violates the generally accepted conception of the board of
47. 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1990).
48. Id. at 572.
49. Id. at 575.
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directors as a sui generis fiduciary of the shareholders not subject to their
control absent a special contract.50 Further, the use of this agency theory
also freed the court from the constraint of Delaware law, which would
have applied under the corporate choice-of-law rule for internal affairs.51
The Schneider opinion has been criticized, perhaps rightly, for its
break with convention. 2 One would expect this criticism to be sufficient
for Delaware to reject the case's sub-agency theory, because the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has made clear its view that the internal-affairs doc-
trine is nearly sacrosanct and may even have federal constitutional
dimensions. 3 Thus, it is generally held that choice-of-law questions con-
cerning, for example, shareholder voting rights, are matters of internal
corporate affairs, regulated by the law of the state of incorporation. 4
However, the Schneider sub-agency rationale is expressly limited to a
sale of control of the business. In the court's words, the purpose of the
banker's opinion "was to advise the shareholders with respect to a trans-
action that contemplated RJR's demise and whose end and aim was to
obtain for the shareholders the highest possible price for their stock." 55
Thus the "sale of the control of a corporation is not corporate business of
the type governed by traditional principles of corporate governance, and
... the Special Committee stood in a relationship to the shareholders
different from that which normally obtains between a corporation's
board and shareholders. 56
This was not a wholly novel doctrine, except as it was applied in the
context of a publicly held corporation. In another well-known New
York case involving a close corporation, the court permitted a deviation
from the corporate norm vesting power to manage the business in direc-
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1990) (authorizing contracts to take
power to manage from the directors and place it in the shareholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350
(1991) (same).
51. See John C. Coffee, Jr., New York's New Doctrine of Constructive Privity, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25,
1990, at 5.
52. Id. at 6; Edward Brodsky, Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders, N.Y. L.J., May 3,
1990, at 3.
53. In McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987), the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the internal-affairs rule applied to a question of the right to vote shares and further stated
that the rule has important constitutional underpinnings in the Due Process, Commerce, and Full
Faith and Credit clauses. The court also strongly disapproved of a Second Circuit opinion, Norlin
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 1984), which had applied New York law to a
Panamanian corporation.
54. See, e-g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
55. Schneider, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
56. Id.
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tors on the same ground that a corporate life threatening transaction was
at issue.57
By the same token, if Schneider is sound, many other corporate-con-
trol transactions would also not be mere matters of the internal affairs of
a corporation. In Edgar v. MITE,58 for example, the Supreme Court
held that tender offer invitations by bidders to shareholders are not inter-
nal affairs regulated by the law of the state of incorporation.
Thus, control transactions ending in a sale of shares that terminates
shareholder interests, such as MBOs and going-private transactions,
could easily fit within the Schneider rationale. Schneider would seem
equally applicable to a cash-out merger or a total liquidation.
But what of liability to shareholders for fairness opinions delivered to a
board in a run-of-the-mill, non-cash-out merger when the opinion is not
communicated to shareholders, but instead is used by a board to satisfy
its duty to be informed under Smith v. Van Gorkom? Clearly this is
traditional internal-affairs law to which Schneider cannot apply. And, of
course, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. 0 would seem to preclude treat-
ment of ordinary mergers as anything other than matters of corporate
law. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods, Corp. ,61 which up-
held the Wisconsin merger moratorium statute, made clear that mergers
are classic cases of intra-corporate regulation and confirmed that,
although tender offers are not internal-affairs matters, voting-rights ques-
tions are.
Thus, Schneider is poor precedent, both because of its aberrant refusal
to follow well-settled concepts of the relationship of directors to share-
holders and because, to the extent its policy is sound, its doctrine fails to
reach many of the cases in which directors use bankers' opinions to im-
munize themselves. It would seem that Schneider, in stretching the law
beyond generally accepted norms, falls short in implementing its policy.
Policy thus cries for a more straightforward doctrinal basis for holding
bankers to a duty of care to shareholders in all of these cases. There is an
elegant basis-the "temporary insider" concept developed in Rule lOb-5
insider-trading cases.
57. Application of Vogel, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1966), aff'd, 224 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y.
1967).
58. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
59. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
60. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
61. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
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C. Bankers as Temporary Insiders Having the Same Fiduciary Duties
as Directors
If a banker in the course of her consultation learns material inside in-
formation with respect to the corporation and trades in its shares, dicta
in the Dirks case may hold her liable to shareholders as a "temporary
insider" who breached her fiduciary duty to the person on the other side
of the trade.62 Dirks purported neither to establish a novel fiduciary duty
analysis nor to articulate an exclusively federal concept of fiduciary duty.
It was merely determining that traditional fiduciary duties exist between
investment bankers and shareholders of their clients. 3 The Court obvi-
ously conceived of this duty as arising from common-law traditions.
Hence it is not a radical departure from accepted norms to rule that an
investment banker in such circumstances is a temporary fiduciary, owing
not only the fiduciary duty to abstain from insider trading with share-
holders, but also other fiduciary duties of "permanent" insiders like di-
rectors and officers-such as a duty of care to shareholders.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has embraced a temporary in-
sider concept for investment bankers, albeit without the nickname. Jus-
tice Moore held, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.,"4 that an
investment banker owes a fiduciary duty of candor to the full board equal
to that of a corporate director or officer.65 Indeed, MacMillan may be
read to hold that bankers owe a fiduciary duty of candor identical to that
of officers and directors. The court, referring to the investment banker
involved, said: "As the duty of candor is one of the elementary principles
of fair dealing, Delaware law imposes this unremitting obligation not
only on officers and directors, but also upon those who are privy to mate-
rial information obtained in the course of representing corporate
interests .,66
The court could have intended that the banker would be liable for the
breach only as an aider and abettor. This possibility exists because at the
end of the paragraph containing the language quoted above, the court
62. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
63. See also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (containing extensive
discussions, in both the majority opinion and Judge Winter's dissent, of fiduciary duties, expressly
drawing on state common-law concepts to implement Rule lOb-5), petition for cert. filed, 60
U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1992) (No. 91-1085).
64. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
65. Id. at 1283.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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cited Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker,67 a case applying the aider-and-
abettor concept.
However, one might instead note that this Delphic paragraph is, in
keeping with the traditions of the development of the common law, a
purposely ambiguous statement. A traditionalist might assert that the
paragraph is unremarkable and merely states that anyone, including a
banker, may be held liable for aiding and abetting a fiduciary in a breach
of trust. On the other hand, to sustain the thesis of this Article it is
necessary to establish that the court was propounding, as alternative
grounds, direct liability of the banker as a principal and vicarious liability
as an aider and abettor.
In support of this view, it should be noted that the quoted sentence
speaks clearly in terms of imposing a direct duty of candor on the
banker, not of vicarious liability for assisting the directors. Further, one
cannot help but believe that MacMillan is at least a trial balloon because
of the evident impatience of the court with the level of performance of
the banker there. Other courts have expressed similar concern.68
The theory remains valid whether or not it has been endorsed by the
Delaware Supreme Court. However, it must be noted that two Delaware
Chancery Court opinions have rejected the notion that bankers are fidu-
ciaries of shareholders.
One of these, the Vice Chancellor's opinion in Weinberger, is not an
imposing obstacle in finding bankers fiduciaries of shareholders because
it rests solely on the ground that the court found no precedent to
follow. 6 9
In Re Shoe-Town, however, a going-private case, did consider the issue
and stands squarely opposed to this Article's thesis.70 The Vice Chancel-
lor, writing prior to the Appellate Division opinion in Schneider, easily
distinguished Wells on the ground that the banker there was hired by the
special committee expressly to determine fairness for the benefit of share-
holders, while the banker's opinion in Shoe-Town was obtained solely for
the purpose of discharging the board's Van Gorkom duties.7 '
67. 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (applying the aider-and-abettor concept to breaches of
corporate fiduciary duties).
68. See, eg., Herskovitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1054, 1060 (1989).
69. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981).
70. 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *17-22 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990).
71. Id. at *20-21.
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Schneider was then on appeal, and the Vice Chancellor unfortunately
did not see fit to cite or distinguish the trial judge's opinion. A further
shortcoming of Shoe-Town is its failure to note the temporary insider
concept of Dirks and the dictum in MacMillan. Shoe-Town also fails to
consider a policy basis for excluding bankers from responsibility for lack
of care.7 2 Since it is a trial court decision, and given its shortcomings, it
may not be the final word in Delaware and should not be very compelling
precedent elsewhere.
Any consideration of the issue should take into account the close anal-
ogy of investment bankers to corporate officers who, although not direc-
tors, are deemed fiduciaries not only of the corporation, but also of the
shareholders. Note the closely parallel status: both are agents of the cor-
poration, albeit one is servant and the other an independent contractor,
and neither is directly appointed by, or subject to, the control of the
shareholders. Officers are deemed fiduciaries of shareholders by virtue of
their superior power to affect shareholder interests. Investment bankers,
when their fairness opinions are sought, are even more powerful in affect-
ing shareholder interests. Thus, a traditional basis for imposing a fiduci-
ary duty is present in all its glory in such engagements of bankers.
Clearly, the legal purpose of the fairness opinion is to protect the
shareholders from an unfair transaction. It does not propose to protect
directors, although it may help the directors discharge their duty to in-
form themselves. For this reason, it seems clear that shareholders have
the exclusive interest in the banker's opinion. Hence, the banker's duty
of care should run to shareholders.
We still need to consider whether more than precedent and logic call
for finding bankers to be in a fiduciary relationship to shareholders. We
must ask whether such a finding would be sound on policy grounds, a
question to which we shortly turn. But before that, consider the other
virtues of such a rule:
(a) It restores the shareholders' right to have someone responsible for exer-
cising due care for the financial fairness aspect of the board's duty;
(b) It makes the duty a matter of internal affairs again, with the law of the
state of incorporation controlling, thereby eliminating the uncertainty
of law depending on the forum;
72. Shoe-Town did hold that the plaintiff had validly asserted that the banker had aided and
abetted the directors in their own alleged breach of fiduciary duties. But this Article takes that
proposition as established.
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(e) Unlike Schneider, which is limited to cases of "corporate demise," it
covers all cases in which directors delegate a task to bankers;
(d) It comports with the reality that the banker is usually a member of a
collectively acting team that includes officers or directors; and
(e) It comports with the further reality that bankers are often in a control
position with their expertise, superior access to information because of
their staff facilities, and the confidence and trust placed in them.
Bankers are thus quintessential fiduciaries.
Are the traditional bases for fiduciary status vis-A-vis shareholders ap-
plicable to investiaent bankers when they advise the board or a commit-
tee thereof? If directors are fiduciaries who delegate a part of their
responsibility to bankers and are thereby excused from responsibility
even if the delegate is negligent, the delegate should be deemed to have
been substituted for the directors. Thus some of the same factors making
the directors fiduciaries of shareholders are present here. These include
reliance on the banker as well as dominance and de facto control over the
transaction-i.e., the process of determining fairness from a financial
point of view.73 Further, like the harbor pilot who is given temporary
control over a ship, the investment banker is in control, superior even to
the target's management.
From another point of view, since it is unquestioned that the invest-
ment banker is a fiduciary to the corporation, and since, at least in a
control transaction, the real parties in interest are shareholders, in such
deals the corporate fiction should be ignored, thereby making the duty
run directly to shareholders. In a further sense, the shareholders are
third-party beneficiaries of the contract between banker and issuer and
should be allowed to enforce the duty of care arising from that
relationship.74
73. "Reliance and de facto control and dominance ... are at the heart of the fiduciary relation-
ship." United States v. Margsotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cited in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991).
74. In Kenney v. Wong Len, 128 A. 343 (N.H. 1925), the court pointed out that the duty of
care arises from the contractual relationship, not from the contract itself:
The obligation to use due care in the performance of a contract arises from the relation the
contract creates, and is independent rather than a part of it. For practical purposes it is
usually not of much consequence whether the breach of the duty is called a tort or a breach
of an implied term of the contract, and the law is more or less indifferent whether action is
brought in tort or assumpsit. But that the obligation arises from the relation and not as an
implied term of the contract is shown by the refusal of the law to permit express terms to
nullify the effect of the obligation.
Id. at 349. Investment-banking experts, given their contractual obligation to provide expert advice
to minority shareholders, their exclusive access to information unknown to the shareholders, and
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Hence, there are sound doctrinal bases in corporate law for state
courts to hold bankers liable to shareholders for negligence when assist-
ing directors. The question is, should that liability be imposed as a mat-
ter of sound policy? Part III addresses this policy question.
III. GATEKEEPER LIABILITY FOR INVESTMENT BANKERS' OPINIONS
As we have seen, in some transactions shareholders rely directly on
bankers' fairness opinions, and in other cases, such as Schneider,
although the shareholders do not so rely, their wealth is directly affected
by the directors' reliance on the opinions. Hence, unreliable bankers'
opinions are not desirable and can injure shareholders.
Some simply conclude that bankers' opinions should be banned. In
part, this suggestion stems from the previously mentioned observation
that directors often obtain and rely on fairness opinions merely to insu-
late themselves from liability for breach of duty. Of course, in such cases
the shareholders are left without recourse. These results suggest that
banishing the bankers would place the responsibility squarely on the di-
rectors' shoulders, where it belongs.
There are two obvious responses to such a suggestion. First, the direc-
tors often are not sufficiently skilled or equipped with staff and facilities
to perform these valuation studies while the bankers are.
Second, the difficulty caused by excusing directors could be alleviated
by several other means without losing the skill and resources of the bank-
ers. These alternatives include:
(a) Not excusing directors even for good faith, justifiable reliance on the
bankers' opinion; and
(b) Excusing the directors if reliance is in good faith and justifiable, but
substituting liability on the bankers for lack of care.
Measure (b) is more acceptable than measure (a), which would require
reversal of the established policy of permitting reliance by directors on
experts. Further, to the extent liability is visited on bankers, one may
expect improvements in the quality of opinions because of the deterrent
effects.
Making bankers liable for culpable acts of course would be a familiar
their knowledge that the shareholders depend on them (see Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Fibreboard
Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974)), seem to be closely akin to the two bank clerks in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), who were held to be fiduciaries and
therefore to have an affirmative duty to disclose values of the shares to the selling shareholders. Id.
at 152. The parallels are stunning.
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application of gatekeeper liability, which has been applied to auditors
and, to a lesser extent, lawyers in analogous situations. 75 The policy
question is whether the analogy from lawyers and auditors to bankers
holds, keeping in mind Cardozo's statement about the danger of blindly
following metaphors.
One important element of gatekeeper liability is its potency. A.A.
Sommer said nearly two decades ago that lawyers who are asked to issue
a legal opinion as a condition to closing a merger or other agreement are
in an ideal position to blow the whistle on illegality or fraud.76 Consider
the even more powerful, and more central, position of the investment
banker whose opinion is requested on the fairness of the terms of a nego-
tiated merger or an MBO. Even a White House veto can be overridden,
but can we imagine a board of directors proceeding with the merger or
MBO that the banker just labelled "unfair"? Would not the transaction
grind to a halt without further damage, including wasteful litigation? A
banker's veto power is at least as great as the auditor's opinion in a regis-
tered offering or the lawyer's opinion in the merger illustration.
By the same token, an incorrect banker's blessing can ruin many for-
tunes. As Judge Friendly suggested in United States v. Benjamin ," "In
our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion
[or, we may add, the banker's fairness opinion] can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."78
Witness the Wells case in which shareholders ostensibly lost three billion
dollars.
Bankers can be very effective in deterring improvident deals. The
banker is much closer to the fulcrum of many transactions for which her
opinion is needed than is the auditor or lawyer.
Another advantage of gatekeeper liability is that the banker is hired for
the very purpose of guarding the gates-unlike lawyers or auditors in
many cases. Hence, imposing a duty here entails no cost for an addi-
tional task, but merely the cost of performing that task carefully. In
other words, the banker need perform no task in addition to that for
which the banker and client have already contracted. Thus, liability is
75. Much of the discussion in this part traces Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strate-
gies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
76. A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-74 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,631 (1974).
77. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
78. Id. at 863.
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not a cost, but an economic benefit because it minimizes wasteful
activity.79
Further, the banker's expertise makes it much easier for her than for
the directors to comprehend the results of her investigation and to apply
her experience and knowledge from other situations. This represents a
further saving because directors generally are lower on the learning
curve. Hence, it is more efficient to impose the full duty and responsibil-
ity on the banker.
Moreover, the investment-banking industry's stock in trade is its repu-
tation and assets, which provide a valuable bond, already incurred, to
assure that the banker will act carefully and skillfully. The individual
banker, her firm, and the whole banking industry suffer when she com-
mits an error or an irregularity, and liability for the individual banker
can take advantage of this by making the opinions more reliable.
Moreover, bankers may need the extra stimulus of potential liability
because they lack some of the strictures that help assure lawyers' and
auditors' skill and care. Bankers have neither an ethics code nor a pro-
fessional association to administer sanctions for deviations from norms.
There is no minimum education or licensing procedure in place. Addi-
tionally, some segments of the banking community possess an en-
trepreneurial ethos very different from that traditionally found in
accounting and law.
The benefits of imposing gatekeeper liability on bankers are clear. If
liable in damages for issuing an incorrect opinion, bankers will not be
easily corrupted by a desire to present an opinion echoing that of those
who pay them, and directors will not tempt bankers with improvident
deals for fear of drawing an adverse opinion. Liability will prevent bad
transactions that otherwise might go through undiscovered amid the
complexities of life.
Of course, gatekeeper liability of bankers will cause additional costs.
Bankers' fees will increase to pay for the risk premium and the additional
79. Judge Cardozo again provides support:
An automobile is manufactured with defective wheels. The question is whether the manu-
facturer owes a duty of inspection to anyone except the buyer. The occupant of the car,
injured because of the defect, presses one view upon the court; the manufacturer, another.
There is small chance, whichever party prevails, that conduct would have been different if
the rule had been known in advance. The manufacturer did not say to himself, "I will not
inspect these wheels, because that is not my duty." Admittedly, it was his duty, at least
toward the immediate buyer. A wrong in any event has been done. The question is to
what extent it shall entail unpleasant consequences on the wrongdoer.
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146 (1921).
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investment in diligent investigation. Some "good" transactions may
never take place because the bankers are unwilling to risk a favorable
opinion. Even here, the opportunity for bankers to present their opinions
carefully, disclosing assumptions, illustrating the sensitivity of final con-
clusions as assumptions are altered, and explaining risks, should serve
not only to minimize liability, but also to inform investors better. In-
deed, bankers' liability for opinions is largely a requirement of full and
candid disclosure. In a mature system, one would expect few cases of
actual liability.
All these benefits and costs are subject to fine tuning by courts ad-
ministering the protocol of the banker's duties as experience accrues. In-
deed, the courts presumably will vary the bankers' due-diligence duties
with the transaction and the context much as SEC Rule 17680 varies with
respect to underwriters' due-diligence duties in public offerings.
A set of due-diligence duties for bankers will not disrupt existing prac-
tices. Bankers investigate facts now. Presumably, managers seeking only
a cursory investigation could continue to do so, but appropriate disclo-
sure would accompany the bankers' disclaimers. Absent disclosure and
disclaimers, more complete due-diligence investigations will be required,
presumably regulated by weighing the costs of various procedures against
the benefits-much like the auditors' investigation of internal controls
for the purpose of issuing audit opinions.
Furthermore, under present practice we have seen too many instances
of bankers' dereliction even in reported decisions."1 What could be more
costly than to permit inadequately prepared fairness opinions to facilitate
transactions that result in ruined companies, costly litigation, and a cyni-
cal investing community?
IV. DETERMINANTS OF THE UTILITY OF FAIRNESS OPINIONS
Finding a basis in fiduciary duty for imposing a duty of care on bank-
ers and justifying it on policy grounds still leaves the question of the
80. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1991).
81. See, eg., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1478-79 (6th Cir. 1987) (bank-
ers' opinion pursuant to SEC Rule 13e-3 is "too conclusory" to justify board's fairness determina-
tion); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 183-85 (3d Cir. 1988) (jury to determine
reasonableness of valuation based on assumption of continuing 46% income tax rate at time when
rate cut was being heavily discussed), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054, 1060 (1989); Mills Acquisition Co.
v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1988) (banker's tipping one side in an auction with
strategically material information and failing to inform board of this auction process taint was a
"fraud on the board").
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contours of that duty. A good deal of work already has been published
to enable a skeletal outline of the characteristics of fairness opinions.
Part IV briefly describes those characteristics, so that we may sketch in
Part V the raw outlines of a protocol for bankers preparing and issuing
fairness opinions.
A. The Variety of Fairness Concepts
Several writers have convincingly explicated the large variation in con-
ceptions of "fairness" depending on the nature of the transaction and its
context.82 To illustrate, Bebchuk & Kahan state:
Take freeze-out mergers as an example. In these mergers, fair price might
focus on the company's value as an independent entity, as the market price
of the minority shares, or as the price the minority shares would receive if
auctioned off as a block. In addition, one might add to any of these meas-
ures a fraction of any freeze-out gains that might arise, or an appropriation
for the tax expenses and reinvestment transaction costs that minority share-
holders must incur.8 3
The profusion of differing concepts of value may cause both director
and banker error. For example, assume a case in which a banker deter-
mines that a range of fair prices for a target's shares is twenty-two to
twenty-eight dollars. When a hostile bid is made at twenty-four dollars,
the banker reasonably may opine that the bid is "inadequate from a fi-
nancial point of view" on the belief that the company has a reasonable
possibility of doing better by some alternative. In the same case, if man-
agement instead wishes only to make the best deal possible without risk
of losing out even on this first offer, the bid could be determined to be
"fair from a financial point of view absent another solid bid."" a
It is important that the banker recognizes and properly articulates the
issue here. One who confuses the two issues might in the second case
opine that the offer is "unfair." At that point, the board is hamstrung
because it would invite litigation by accepting an unfair offer, even
should the banker reverse itself after clarifying the issue.
This fairness-inadequacy example merely illustrates that the concept of
82. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 6, at 30-34; Leonard Chazen, Fairness from a Financial
Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Stan-
dard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439, 1443-50 (1981); Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 256 (1983); Donald M.
Feuerstein, Valuation and Fairness Opinions, 32 Bus. LAW. 1337 (1977).
83. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 6, at 33 (citations omitted).
84. Chazen, supra note 82, at 1453-56.
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fairness depends on the transaction or its context. Other more subtle
varieties of fairness are explained by the above authorities85 and need not
be pursued further here. The point is that the banker's duty should in-
clude both addressing the issue and disclosing why the banker chose the
particular fairness concept at issue.
B. Varieties of Measurement of Values
Bebchuk and Kahan further describe the well-known fact that there
are a large variety of measures of value.86 These include the three famil-
iar elements that had constituted the old Delaware block-asset values,
discounted values of estimated future profits, and market value of
shares-and a fourth, the Delaware block rule itself-an average of the
three elements weighted to taste.87 Another is the discounted future cash
flow measurement method expressly sanctioned in Weinberger v. UOP.
There are still others described in the cited articles. 8 Since all of these
are susceptible to subjective judgment, no two analysts in a blindfold test
would ever arrive at identical figures. For example, in using discounted
cash flows, estimating the amount and timing of all future cash flow-
with such variables as changes in tax and inflation rates, technology, and
the risks of the particular company and industry-approaches mere
guesswork.8 9
C. Bankers' Independence
Additionally, as Bebchuk and Kahan detail,9 0 bankers frequently have
interests that conflict with the shareholders' and the corporation's.
Bankers are unlikely to bite the (managers') hand that feeds them. Fur-
ther, their success may depend on a reputation for innovativeness, for
spectacular success, or for "always winning"-perhaps at any cost.
D. Summary
As to each of these-the variety of fairness concepts, the variations in
measurement techniques, and the conflicts of interest-Bebchuk and
Kahan make clear that they are merely detailing ancient wisdom. Their
85. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
86. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 6, at 34-37.
87. See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Mass. 1979).
88. See supra note 82.
89. TED J. FFLIs, ACCOUNTING ISSUES FOR LAWYERS 695-701 (4th ed. 1991).
90. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 6, at 37-45.
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contribution makes the evidence absolutely clear and convincing, and
their conclusions are taken as established for purposes of this paper.
V. THE PROTOCOL FOR THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' DUTY IN
PREPARING AND ISSUING FAIRNESS OPINIONS
To summarize, we concluded in Part II that no doctrinal difficulty
prevents holding bankers liable to shareholders for breach of a duty of
care, regardless of shareholder reliance, since the banker's opinion is
commissioned for the ultimate benefit of shareholders. We also outlined
in Part III the gatekeeper policy analysis for making bankers liable. In
Part IV, we briefly recalled the findings of the literature on the character-
istics of fairness opinions, including the varieties of fairness concepts and
measurements, and the relevance of conflicts of interest of the banker.
As a final question, what shall be the outlines of the protocol for bank-
ers' duties? The fleshing out of the answer will take place through ordi-
nary common-law, case-by-case development. But the outlines may be
here tentatively sketched merely for illustrative purposes.
A. The Contents of the Standard of Care
Presumably, the standard of care required of bankers will be the same
as for other professionals-that of their profession unless the individual
claims a higher standard. These would include duties of care: (1) in
maintaining the appropriate level of skill; (2) in selecting and disclosing
the appropriate fairness concept for the transaction; (3) in selecting, dis-
closing, and explaining the measurement techniques used--e.g., dis-
counted cash flow, liquidation value; (4) in fully disclosing any and all of
the bankers' conflicts of interest; and (5) in fully disclosing all qualifica-
tions, assumptions, and sensitivity studies deemed necessary to give an
adequate comprehension of the opinion.
Note that when the banker selects and discloses the appropriate fair-
ness concept-(2) above-she must frame and explain the issue being
addressed. Is the matter one of determining if the value being offered is
the best price obtainable, or one of determining if accepting the offer is
reasonable in the circumstances? Here the banker must be skillful in as-
certaining the client's purposes, and she will often require advice of coun-
sel as to the appropriate concept of value.
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B. Due Diligence
Arthur Rosenbloom and Arthur Aufses, a banker and his lawyer, have
tentatively assayed three areas for diligence:91 (1) document review, (2)
on site inspections, and (3) interviews of key persons.
An adequate due-diligence investigation would be necessary to have a
reasonable basis for the conclusions reached in investment bankers' fair-
ness opinions, a minimum requirement for such opinions.92
Due diligence here would be akin to that required of auditors doing an
audit, investment bankers underwriting securities offerings, special litiga-
tion committees exercising business judgment concerning whether to
continue a stockholders' derivative suit, directors investigating merger
terms before recommending the merger to shareholders, or an attorney
investigating before issuing legal opinions.
Although many express concern that bankers not be put into a strait-
jacket, their fear is unfounded. The object of establishing due-diligence
standards is to ease the task of professionals while assuring quality-the
same reasons auditors, lawyers, and others strive to establish standards
for their due-diligence duties.
C. Customs and Practices and the T.J. Hooper Concept
Because the fairness-opinion industry is still in its infancy, and because
the opinion is for the benefit of and affects large numbers of public share-
holders, the transaction costs in establishing appropriate practices are so
high that courts should feel free to require higher standards than cur-
rently may be in effect. Thus, as in The T.J. Hooper,93 in which Learned
Hand required ship-to-shore radios for coastwise shipping despite their
not being customary, courts should feel free to require certain measures
of care for bankers' opinions even if not customary. Thus disclosure
standards, compulsory sensitivity studies, and the like might be
appropriate.
91. Arthur Rosenbloom & Arthur Aufses, On Understanding Investment Banker Liability, 4
INSIGHTs 3 (1990).
92. For a discussion of "Reasonable Basis," see Ted J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants'
Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31 (1975).
93. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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D. Disclaimers
As with auditors' and attorneys' opinions, certain disclaimers will be
necessary on occasion. They should be subject to full disclosure.
E. Indemnification
Principles of indemnification law should be carefully applied here. If
the effect of indemnification in a particular case will be to saddle the loss
on shareholders, courts should feel free not to enforce such clauses.
F. Exculpation
Bankers will seek exculpation even for ordinary negligence. Where
shareholders have the right of recovery, exculpation clauses negotiated
with managers ordinarily should not apply. In the legal profession, ex-
culpatory arrangements are unenforceable except against the most so-
phisticated clients.94  Courts frequently invalidate exculpatory
agreements for professionals.95 Similar doctrines should apply to excul-
patory clauses here.
G. Other Limiting Arrangements
Schneider has stimulated bankers to seek forum-selection, law-selec-
tion, and jury-waiver clauses in their engagement agreements. Given the
lack of privity with shareholders, these forms of opting out should not be
too freely allowed.
CONCLUSION
It appears that liability of bankers to shareholders for negligently pre-
pared fairness opinions is defensible on traditional doctrinal grounds and
desirable on policy grounds, at costs far outweighed by the benefits.
94. None of these should apply for shareholders actions unless contracted away by
shareholders.
95. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 5-7 (1986). In Erlich v.
First National Bank, 505 A.2d 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) the court avoided an exculpa-
tory clause in an investment management contract. "As a general rule, the courts will not enforce an
exculpatory clause if the party benefiting from exculpation is subject to a positive duty imposed by
law or is imbued with a public trust, or if exoneration of the party would adversely affect its public
interest." Id. at 232.
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